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"Die
transatlantischen Beziehungen nach den Wahlen" - Rede von
Karsten D.Voigt, Koordinator für die deutsch-amerikanischen
Beziehungen, Philadelphia,12.11.2002 (englisch)
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you for inviting me to talk about the current state ofTransatlantic
Relations after the German elections.I.For over fifty years, the
transatlantic partnership has beenone of the fundamental pillars
of German foreign policy alongsidethe European unification process
in the EU. This specialrelationship for all of us was, is and
will be based on values,interests, and, ultimately, visions of
what the world should looklike. Germany's reaction to September
11 exemplifies ourcloseness. The German people were the one\'s
who after Sept. 11demonstrated second to none their horror, grief
and sympathy withthe American people. The shared feelings made
possible theincredible success of the German American Solidarity
Fund, whichour Embassy in Washington established. No other nation
donatedmore than the German. In the political arena Chancellor
Schröderpledged unlimited solidarity to the U.S. in the global
fightagainst terrorism. As he decided to commit troops to OperationEnduring
Freedom and the military campaign in Afghanistan lastyear, he
also placed his political existence on the line -and succeeded.A
recent study by the German Marshall Fund and the ChicagoCouncil
on Foreign Relations reconfirms that when it comes tovalues and
principles, Germans and Americans do not think asdifferently as
media reports would have us believe.When we stop and think about
this solid bedrock, the obviousquestion is how did we get from
there to our present discord.During the process of German unification
the Bush 41administration had a farsighted vision about Germany'sfuture
role in international politics. They understood thatGermany, integrated
into the EU and into NATO, will continue toshare and support in
principle US global positions, thoughdifferences in opinion would
occur in individual cases. Thisoptimistic analysis still stands
to be corrected, even if ourcurrent discord about the right methods
how to deal with Iraq isdominating the headlines.I would like
to make a couple observations on this note ofdiscord.First and
foremost, even in the transatlantic debate onIraq we agree on
fundamentals. We all - Americans andGermans alike - agree that
Saddam Hussein is a dictatorwhose rule has inflicted enormous
suffering on the people ofIraq. We agree he has flouted UN Security
Council resolutions. Weagree that he is striving for weapons of
mass destruction, wehave to assume that he would not shy away
from threatening to usethem, and we agree that Saddam Hussein
has been aggressive in thepast and could be aggressive again in
the future. We agree thatweapons inspectors should return to Iraq
as soon as possible, andthat they should have full and unrestricted
access to allpossible weapons sites - as Baghdad has promised.
To sum up,we agree that all relevant Security Council Resolutions
should beimplemented in their entirety and without delay.However,
regarding a military strike against Iraq Germany hasbeen asking
a number of questions and we feel quite strongly thatthey need
to be addressed. What consequences would an attack on Iraq have
on our joint war on terrorism? How could a post-war Iraq look
like, how can we minimize the risk of disintegration? Are our
societies prepared to bring a long-term engagement in Iraq? Would
we turn the Arab street even more against us? What are the likely
repercussions to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict? How can we avoid further destabilizing the Middle East
as a whole?In the face of these questions Germany remains skepticalregarding
military actions.Secondly: The discord on Iraq is mainly between
ourcurrent governments. The people on both sides of the Atlantic
askthe same questions and voice similar concerns. As the Americanpopulation
seems to be relatively supportive about militaryactions against
Iraq, even the population of it\'s most vociferousally on this
issue, the British is deeply skeptical. At the sametime, a significant
minority in Germany would support militaryaction against Iraq
if the UN expressly sanction such action andother options do not
ensure that Iraq stays free of atomicweapons.Thirdly: Let there
be no mistake. I am talking aboutdifferences of opinion on Iraq,
not on transnational terrorism.Differing on Iraq does not mean
we are backing away from the waragainst terrorism. On the contrary,
we remain fully engaged.Roughly, 1300 German troops remain stationed
in Kabul, andindeed, the Netherlands and Germany will jointly
assume leadnation responsibility in Afghanistan next year. Some
100 Germanelite soldiers are fighting alongside U.S. Special Forces
inAfghanistan, German tanks remain stationed in Kuwait, and theGerman
navy patrols the Horn of Africa. All this is part of acoalition
effort to win the war against international terrorism.In fact,
a full third of all military personnel engaged in thiseffort is
not American!Currently, roughly 9.500 German troops - second only
tothe US - are fulfilling military missions abroad, be it in theBalkans
(KFOR 4600, MAZ 220, SFOR 1500) or in the context ofEnduring Freedom.
With this engagement, we have for the timebeing more or less exhausted
our capabilities for militaryengagement beyond homeland defense.This
too has to be taken into account when we are talkingabout actions
against Iraq and engagement in Iraq afterwards.Fourthly: Looking
at German engagement abroad we shouldnot forget that ten years
ago such an engagement not only wouldhave been impossible but
also unimaginable. Since the fall of theWall Germany has seen
its troops in action in Somalia, Bosnia,East Timor, Kosovo, the
Caucasus, Macedonia and now Afghanistan.Still, Germans remain
to be conflicted about war in general,and about Iraq in particular.
Because of our traumatic memoriesof World War II Germans are very
adverse to the thought of Germantroops going to war. In the past
forty years, the FederalRepublic of Germany has had great success
with its multilateralforeign policy (e.g. Euro-Atlantic integration,
CSCE) and it willcontinue to strive to solve problems primarily
along this line.The situation is even more complicate amongst
my fellow citizensin East Germany. As a result of their own post-war
history, theytend towards pacifism, wish to avoid any additional
uncertaintiesafter the overwhelming changes of 1990 and remain
suspiciousabout global power politics.Additionally, when President
Bush called for a "war"against terrorism, many
Germans were frightened. Unaware of thedifferent use of the word
"war" in American politicalterminology, take
for instance the "war" on poverty,for Germans
the word "war" stirs up memories ofdevastation
on European soil wrought by two world wars.Concluding from this
prevailing attitude, the current mood inGermany is not about Anti-Americanism
but about German attitudevis-à-vis military power and the
exertion of military power.Coming back to the GMF and CCFR study
I already referred to, itclearly underlines this observation.In
comparison to French and British: more Germans think that the
EU should play a regional role and leave the global tasks to the
US; Germans are less inclined to think that the EU should become
a superpower like the US; Germans are less willing to increase
the defense budget and expand economic aid; Germans are less thinking
that it will be the best for the future of their own country if
it takes an active role in world affairs; Germans are much less
willing to act militarily even if Iraq possesses weapons of mass
destruction.At the same time the figures in the study underline
thatGermany has already come a long way since 1990. Not least,political
leadership contributed to this development. It haschanged gradually
political patterns and even soul with regard tothe use of force
in foreign policy. However, election campaignsare usually not
the time in which politicians try to change deeprooted public
opinion. Quite the contrary they try to cater topublic sentiment
and opinion - I presume both the German and theUS democracy share
this experience. On top of this generalobservation the red-green
coalition government has not beenconvinced before and after the
elections that a Germanparticipation in a military campaign against
Iraq is justifiable.Only slowly, Germans are getting adjusted
to a more robustpolicy based on the use of force as a means of
last resort.Optimistic as I am, I predict that in a decade from
now Germany,France an the UK will have quite similar military
capabilities attheir disposal and will pursue similar defense
policies.Fifthly: Turning to the issue of Anti-Americanism thestudy
comes up with interesting numbers too. In comparison toFrench
and British, less Germans have problems with US superpowerstatus
and Germans share as many warm feelings towards the US asthe British
do.Some harsh words and accusations have been traded back andforth
across the Atlantic these past weeks. At the same timerepresentatives
of the media are tossing stereotypes about ratherthan arguments:
American cowboys or Rambo figures on the onehand, and naive and
timid Europeans or EU-nuchs on the other.I do not need to point
out how much I think that these verbaltradeoffs were most unfortunate
and, even more, how much theymisrepresent the reality of German-American
friendship. Thedisplay of anti-American prejudice in Europe or
anti-Europeanprejudice in America is as unhelpful as the stereotypes
areinaccurate.I would wish that both sides would deal with their
differencesin a less heated, more sober manner. That we are facing
morepoints of friction is also a result of ourrelations becoming
ever closer. Growing economic andsocial integration and the lively
cultural exchange help nurturethe almost domestic-policy character
of transatlantic relations.Take for instance Halloween: A decade
ago, Halloween played norole in German live. Since then the tradition
has been gainingpopularity steadily.Today people on both sides
of the Atlantic are discussingissues that were traditionally the
preserve of domestic policy:environmental and consumer protection,
domestic security, thedeath penalty etc. The domestic policy debates
impact each other,particularly during an election campaign.A final
remark on this: As an outcome of the generalelections, the only
political party in the former Bundestag whichis truly anti-American,
the PDS didn\'t make the cut and staysshut out of the parliament
for the first time in their existence.Sixthly: Eurobashing, too
is back in fashion in the US.Pick up any US-newspaper on any given
day, and you can findsomebody speaking out against Europe. What
has prompted theseanti-European rumblings?First, US is constantly
ambivalent in its approach to Europe,on the one hand supporting
European integration, on the otherfearing the birth of a new rival,
calling for burden sharing, butrefraining from sharing leadership.Second,
as America wields unprecedented power, it issusceptible to disregarding
others.Third, still Americans suffer from dwindling information
andexpertise on Europe, the EU as well as about the changes incountries
like my own. Take for instance the American response tothe EURO.
First inattention, then assertions that it cannotsucceed, then
a debate about its potential to rival the Dollar.Most of American
reactions to European progress follow thispattern.However, the
Europeans are making a much greater contribution,as mentioned,
to the fight against international terrorism and tothe solution
of other global issues than many Americancommentators are willing
to admit. The European Union and itsmember states contribute three
times more development aid aroundthe world than the US; they provide
four times more soldiers orpersonnel both in the Balkans and for
general United Nationspeacekeeping missions; to date they have
spent ten times more oneconomic reconstruction and integration
in Central and EasternEurope; they shoulder 40 per cent of the
total UN budget.Turning around the famous quote attributed to
Henry Kissingerabout the lack of a single phone number in Europe
- whichdefinitely has its merits - we Europeans too have to grapple
withthe confusion of competing power centers in the Administrationitself
and Washington on the whole.II.Ladies and Gentlemen,The events
of Sept. 11 have made it clear that we are livingin a time of
change which has begun long before the attacks onWashington and
New York. Until then, especially Europeanattitudes, mindsets,
and the transatlantic routine were stilltrapped in cold war thinking
and thus a Eurocentric viewpoint,even if the Berlin Wall had fallen
more than ten years earlier.Since 1990, for the first time in
centuries, Germans have beenliving with the reassurance that they
are surrounded only byfriends and partners for the first time
in centuries. There aremore than a million fewer soldiers stationed
in Germany now thanin 1989; almost all nuclear weapons and most
foreign troops- happily not all - have been withdrawn. The legitimate
joyover new opportunities after the end of the cold war in Germanyand
in other European countries thus blurred the perception ofnew
risks - until Sept. 11 changed the world.I would like to highlight
only a couple of the fundamentalchanges which have occurred in
the last decade: The number and character of international players
has grown and changed considerably. Sept. 11 proved that the world
has entered a new period in which non-state actors, even individuals
are capable of seriously threatening national and international
security. We are confronted by a host of "new"
issues, some of which are not totally new but have been suppressed
or been of secondary importance during the Cold War, for example
terrorism, illicit trade in drugs, international crime, money
laundering (which accounts for an estimated 2 to 5% of global
income), disease; some of which have changed their nature as transnational
terrorism; others which we have inherited from the Cold War, for
instance global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems, large quantities of highly toxic plutonium,
huge stockpiles of chemical weapons. The attacks of Sept. 11 demonstrated
the vulnerability of an open society. What has been the favourites
pass-time for some experts, to analyse hypothetical attacks against
public utilities or our communication systems, amongst other via
cyberspace, has now moved to the centre of our attention. If we
used to think almost exclusively of nuclear weapons as weapons
of mass destruction, events since Sept. 11 - I need only refer
to the anthrax attacks - have made it clear that in future we
also have to fear biological and chemical attacks on our security.
As the potential to wreck havoc has increased, we have to concentrate
more than ever on preventing emerging risks from materialising.
The geographical distance to a crisis becomes less and less important.
In consequence, we can no longer think of security in entirely
military terms or simply in terms of defending borders.The impression
of a new uncertainty in the sense of a realitythat is growing
more and more complex has been made possible andenhanced by the
rapid pace of technological development andeconomic liberalization
in the last decades. New technologies arechanging our societies
in fundamental ways, offering tremendousnew challenges and opportunities.
The Internet and the NewEconomy are enabling, individuals, enterprises,
organizations,associations and communities to operate, learn and
communicate inpreviously impossible ways and moreover ever more
quickly andcheaply. Three decades ago, phone lines could accommodate
about80 calls at one time between Europe and North America; today
theycan handle one million. Today, every day, 500,000 airlinepassengers,
1.4 billion e-mail messages, and 1.5 trillion dollarscross the
Atlantic Ocean.The US have for quite a while made efforts to adapt
theirsecurity policy to the emerging threats. Missile defense
is anoutcome. With the myth of American invulnerability shattered
onSept. 11, the debate on how to tackle these new threats and
howto devise international security has picked up speed. On the
onehand, the US has a desire to establish a deterrent capacityagainst
asymmetric attacks. Additionally it is pondering thepossibility
of preemptive strikes in case prevention, deterrenceand containment
fail. On the other hand, also the US acknowledgesthat military
power alone doesn't resolve conflicts. Toquote President Bush:
"To make the world secure, we have tocreate a better
world". In consequence policies, furtheringdevelopment,
democracy, human rights are perceived to be equallynecessary.
The National Security Strategy published on Sept. 20reflects this
comprehensive approach. Unfortunately the otherside of this coin
receives too little emphasis in the rhetoric ofthe Administration
and in consequence even less attention inEuropean public opinion.Europe
is invited to challenge these new ideas or securitydoctrines and
the assessment on which they are based on. Forinstance, it is
not in the interest even to the US to developprinciples that grant
every nation the right of pre-emption onthe basis of it's own
definition. Other questions arefloating around. When would regime
change be legitimate? Couldregime change be in accordance with
current international law?The National Security Strategy deserves
broad and criticalreflection, but not cheap criticism. It is not
the US view onsecurity strategy which has changed first, the securityenvironment
has. Europeans have to develop viable alternativesand position
these on the market place of ideas, especially inWashington.III.In
domestic European policy, the attacks of Sept. 11spotlighted the
importance and necessity of further deepening andenlarging the
European Union (EU). It is true that militarydecisions in the
crisis were taken in the national capitals, butat the same time
decisions made by the European Councils (summitmeetings of the
European heads of State and government) onSeptember 21 and October
19, 2001 on combating terrorism gavestrong impetus to the "deepening"
of the EU,particularly in the "third pillar"
of justice and homeaffairs, but also in the Common Foreign and
Security Policy(CFSP) as well as ESDP. The Europeans must go further
and thinkthrough how to reform the mechanisms and instruments
of CFSP toguarantee more effective policy-making and uniform external
EUaction. The Convention on the Future of Europe is currentlyconsidering
not only internal institutional reforms of the EU,but also Europe\'s
future role in the world. The European publichas invested high
hopes in the Convention\'s treatment of thisissue. Both the convention
and the subsequent intergovernmentalconference that will act on
the convention\'s recommendations in2004 must live up to these
expectations. Only if Europe managesto make decisive progress
in the field of CFSP, ESDP and theshaping of EU foreign policy
as a whole will Europe satisfy itscitizens\' expectations and
be able to counter the new securitythreats. Last but not least,
with capabilities Europe wouldbecome more and more a relevant
partner to the US.NATO, of course, is no longer the cold-war instrument
it oncewas. Both President Bush and Russian President Vladimir
Putinproclaimed the definitive end of the cold war in their speechesin
the Reichstag in Berlin, the city that most symbolized thatera.
Given the dangers that have been identified since the fallof the
Berlin Wall, security issues will continue to play animportant
role in the Euro-Atlantic community. In future it willstill be
NATO, which will focus on these issues. On September 12,2001 NATO
invoked Article 5 of the alliance\'s original WashingtonTreaty
in a situation utterly different from that envisaged bythe founders
of NATO fifty years ago. But this did not changeNATO and its role
of keeping crises at bay and, where necessary,acting militarily
even beyond Europe against aggressors,regardless of whether an
attack comes from Europe or beyond. Thetheoretical discussion
about "in" and"out-of-area"
- a difference not addressed in theWashington Treaty - is thus
finally obsolete. In November inPrague we will, on the basis of
the flexible NATO StrategicConcept of 1999, provide guidelines
for the profile of thecapabilities individual member states must
have to meet the newsecurity threats. This will include a debate
on the recent USproposal for setting up a NATO response force.The
application of the mutual defense clause after September11 also
demonstrated that it has been a long time since NATO wastargeted
at Russia. Indeed, the first invocation of Article 5 inthe alliance\'s
history brought NATO and Russia closer together.The Russian president
used September 11 as an opportunity to movehis country closer
to the Western community. This in turn pavedthe way for creation
in 2002 of the NATO-Russia Council and thefar-reaching American-Russian
nuclear arms reduction treaty,along with the bilateral Strategic
Declaration that closed thecold war and the admission of Russia
as a full-fledged member ofthe G7. All these steps were in keeping
with long-standingEuropean objectives and interests.All these
developments confirm, that the Alliance is alive andis capable
of adapting to the new international challenges afterthe end of
the Cold War. It is doing its job in today\'s securityenvironment.
It is an alliance of nations whose values andinterests broadly
coincide and an alliance not only of tacticalbut also of strategic
partners. It is here that the most trustingmultilateral dialogue
is nurtured, it is here that nationaldefense and security policies
are integrated into multilateralstructures and perspectives. Last
but not least it is the keyinstitutional link between Europe and
North America.To sum up: NATO and the EU have become institutions,
which nolonger symbolize the division of Europe, but rather itsunification.IVDespite
the current disagreements, we have to keep the bigpicture in mind.
As I have outlined right at the beginning,Americans and Europeans
are linked by shared values, interests,and, ultimately, visions
of what the 21st centuryworld should look like: a world based
on freedom, human rights,and the rule of law. Neither Europe nor
the US cansuccessfully work for peace and democracy in the world
when theystand alone, even less so in opposition. Only together
we will beable to defend our convictions. The transatlanticpartnership
is one of the key prerequisites for global stabilityand security.The
management of the new agenda of common values and ofdifferences
will in the future, as in the past, keep putting theEuro-Atlantic
relationship to the test. Transatlantic commonground and differences
are two sides of the same coin, and thisin itself is a measure
of how close we have become.Thank you very much for your attention!
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