"Die transatlantische Beziehungen nach dem 11. September" - Rede von Karsten D. Voigt, Koordinator für die deutsch-amerikanische Zusammenarbeit im Auswärtigen Amt, im Goethe-Institut Toronto am 25. April 2002 (englisch)

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Thank you for your invitation and for the opportunity to speak
to you about Transatlantic Relations in the aftermath of
September 11. First of all, I would like to do away with a common
misperception. Transatlantic relations are as much about
German-Canadian relations as they are about the relationship
between Europe an the US. Most issues we are raising with
Washington are issues which are likewise on our agenda with
Ottawa, perhaps with the exception of our respective trade
disagreements with Washington.

In the age of the Cold War, Canadian troops symbolised
Canada\'s contribution to the transatlantic relationship as well
as the Canadian people\'s great solidarity with Germany. Canadian
pilots participated in the Berlin airlift; Canadian citizens sent
care packages; Canadian troops stationed since 1951 in the newly
founded Federal Republic of Germany always stressed that they
came as friends, not as occupational forces. Over the decades,
more then 300.000 Canadian soldiers were stationed in Germany.
Even after the last Canadian troops had left in 1993, Germany
continued to have a keen interest in an active Canadian role in
transatlantic relations. Under the German EU presidency in 1994,
the European Union and Germany established a regular dialogue
between the EU and Canada on both foreign and security affairs,
as well as on non-traditional matters, such as migration and
international crime. In 1996, Germany was instrumental in helping
finalise the Canada/EU Action Plan and Joint Declaration. At the
same time, Canada has demonstrated her continuing support of the
transatlantic relationship by engaging substantially in the
Bosnia and Kosovo peace efforts. That was not a matter of course.
But: Our common interests in foreign affairs are not limited to
the Balkans. To give but one example: Germany and Canada both
have a strong interest in an economically and politically stable
Ukraine. Canada\'s involvement in multilateral structures as NATO
and OSCE ensures that she remains a European player.

All in all, the recent visits of Governor General Clarkson and
Prime Minister Chrétien have underlined the importance of your
bilateral ties. In June Federal Chancellor Schröder will return
the visit.

Last but not least, the job description of the Co-ordinator
for the German-American Co-operation was changed to live up to
this perception. Initially the position of the Co-ordinator was
created in 1981 by the German and US governments. As I took
office in 1999, the German Foreign Office expanded the scope of
the Co-ordinator\'s activities by including Canada.

This transatlantic relationship, which, alongside German
relations with our partners in the EU, has for over fifty years
been one of the two pillars of German foreign policy, is
presently determined by the attacks on New York and Washington of
September 11. These attacks were not just directed at the US as
the most powerful symbol of the democratic community of values,
but also against us, Germans and Canadians alike, as fellow
members of this community of values. They made it clear that even
at the beginning of the 21st century we must all the
more work together to secure peace and freedom in the North
Atlantic area and beyond.

With the fall of the Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Germans left the dangers of the Cold War behind
them. Germany has now been living for more than eleven years safe
in the knowledge of being surrounded only by friends and partners
for the first time in centuries. This is no delusion. Yet our
justified delight in Germany about this has blinded us to the new
risks. As September 11 exposed, these risks do not come from our
immediate neighbours and yet they threaten our security, whether
directly or indirectly. These dangers can evolve from crises
within Europe, as most recently in the Balkans, or beyond Europe.

For the US, September 11 brought an even greater sea change:
it meant the definitive end of the myth of invulnerability. The
attacks on New York and Washington claimed more victims than the
attack on Pearl Harbor, and many commentators attributed a
similar impact to September 11, 2001 as to December 7, 1941. The
attacks brought home to America the fact that it is no longer
protected by two oceans and immune to events elsewhere. The
American Dream is being blurred by the trauma of terrorism. At
the same time, the attacks have united the country: Americans are
more determined than ever to fight for the American idea.

Of the aforementioned dangers, international terrorism, has
been on the agenda of politicians, the police and the
intelligence services around the world for some time, and is now
also on the military agenda. The attacks on New York and
Washington, however, represent an incomprehensible increase in
trans-national terrorist aggression. In addition, there are other
dangers which we must not ignore, namely those posed by the
global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems, by the illicit trade in drugs, by international
crime, by money laundering, which accounts for roughly between 2
and 5% of global income, by diseases, environmental degradation
or by attacks on computer systems

The challenges facing security and defence policy today are
not all new, many of them have been suppressed or been of
secondary importance during the Cold War. However they have taken
on new aspects: As already pointed out, the geographical distance
to a crisis becomes less and less important. In consequence, we
can no longer think of security in entirely military terms or
simply in terms of defending borders. Secondly, risks endanger
not only our external security but at the same time our national
security and the security of our everyday lives. Take for example
an attack in cyberspace against our communication systems or
utilities. Since World War II, security threats have more and
more blurred the line between foreign and domestic policy.
Thirdly, if we used to think almost exclusively of nuclear
weapons as being weapons of mass destruction, events since
September 11 – I need only refer to the anthrax attacks
– have made it clear that in future we also have to fear
biological and chemical attacks on our security.

It is an open question whether the attacks of September 11
represent the start of a new age. Certainly the attacks have
exposed that our patterns of thinking were still firmly those of
the Cold War, even though it ended over ten years ago.

For transatlantic relations, September 11 demonstrated that
security issues will continue to play an important role in the
Euro-Atlantic community. They by no means disappeared with the
end of the Cold War. Standing at the side of the US against the
terrorist threat is a dictate not just of our gratitude for US
support over the last fifty years, but also of our own best
interests. Only by acting together can we protect Germany, Canada
and Europe in the face of similar challenges. Only those who
prove their worth as partners now will be able to rely on finding
partners themselves in difficult times. And were Germany or
Canada to be the target of such a terrorist attack, we would be
even more dependent on solidarity, support and assistance than
the US. It is in our interest and that of our neighbours that the
US continues to be engaged in Europe for peace and freedom and
thus that it retains a military presence here.

On September 12 last year NATO applied Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty to a situation entirely different from the one
Nato\'s founding fathers had in mind fifty years ago. NATO has
long ceased to be directed against Russia. The first invocation
of Article 5 in the Alliance\'s history did not divide NATO and
Russia, it drew them together. Since the terrorist attacks
President Putin has demonstrated notable resolve to integrate
Russia into the global anti-terror coalition and to open his
country more towards the West. NATO and Russia are using this
momentum to renew their partnership. This new partnership is
incidentally not a hindrance, but rather an invaluable tool for
the further opening of the Alliance to new members.

We all know that Europe will be more secure if Russia
co-operates closely with NATO and the EU. Constructive
co-operation with a country as large and important as Russia
– the same applies to Ukraine - is crucial for the
resolution of global issues like combating terrorism, problems
with disarmament, control of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and global climate protection.

Contrary to some public misperceptions, Nato\'s performance
since 9/11 provides impressive confirmation that the Alliance is
alive and well. It is doing its job in today\'s security
environment, the only alliance capable of taking on every
conceivable military task . It is an alliance of nations whose
values and interests broadly coincide and an alliance not only of
tactical but also of strategic partners. It is here that the most
trusting multilateral dialogue is nurtured, it is here that
defence and security policy is denationalised. Numerous US
politicians have made clear commitments to NATO and its
outstanding importance.

NATO has undergone reforms since the end of the Cold War. I am
confident that it will continue to reform itself in order to be
able to respond adequately and efficiently to new risks.

International terrorism threatens our mutual world-wide
interests. This threat, like other dangers, must be tackled on
all fronts: political, economic, intelligence, police, military
where necessary, and not least through a peaceful dialogue with
the Islamic culture and religion. This will be a long process.
The first aim must be to pursue and punish perpetrators, their
helpers and their sponsors. Further, we must ensure that
terrorists can never again find a safe haven anywhere in the
world. This is the decisive aspect of the second phase of the
current fight against terrorism. This also means that we must do
everything possible to prevent "failed states". The
American military campaign in Afghanistan was also the first step
towards enabling the country to get itself back into the circle
of civilised nations. Furthermore, the reaction of NATO, the US,
the EU member states and the UN must exclude the possibility of
the danger simply reappearing in a different form as a result of
the methods used to combat it. Not least, we must eradicate the
root causes of terrorism and resolve the conflicts from which it
profits resolved.

Allow me to say a few words about the dialogue with Islam and
its culture. With it we are facing a very difficult and lengthy
task, about which we must have no illusions. At the same time, we
must not turn Islam into an enemy. A confrontation between
"the West" and Islam would be a victory for the
terrorists. Take for example the situation in Germany: Some three
million Muslims currently live in Germany. A constructive
relationship between Islam and our pluralist democracy is
therefore also indispensable for inner peace in our country. In
February the Islamic Council of Germany issued an Islamic charter
in which it underlines its commitment to the principles of
democratic pluralism and human rights. This statement marks an
important contribution to a constructive relationship between our
growing number of German Muslims and our old Judeo-Christian
tradition.

What we are dealing with is a "struggle for
civilisation". Shaping this presents our transatlantic
community with new tasks. As part of the transatlantic community
we have to work together on the intellectual and cultural
implications of terrorism and to devise and implement common
positions. This shows that the transatlantic dialogue must shake
off the mentality of the East-West confrontation and concentrate
on new issues. Alongside the Islamic world, other topics could of
course be the Middle East, South Asia or East Asia. In a gesture
of solidarity China has supported the US campaign against
terrorism and even the military strikes against Afghanistan. This
is the first time that China has supported a US military action
since the end of the Cold War, opening the door to a new
definition of the relationship between the two countries.

The weeks following September 11 also showed that such dangers
not only render co-operation among virtually all states in the
international community necessary, but make it possible at all.
This multilateral approach is shared by decision-makers in Europe
and Canada, but not by all in Washington. Nevertheless, the
tragedy of September 11 immediately enhanced some international
co-operative elements. This is a trend to be nurtured.

International politics is going to have to gear itself to the
phenomenon of terrorism. So far, the focus had been on relations
between states, now it is also on the actions of non-state
players. The UN has risen to this new challenge. On September 12
last year, the Security Council determined in Resolution 1368
that it considers terrorist attacks such as those carried out in
New York and Washington to be a threat to international peace and
security. On September 28 it followed up on this resolution with
a comprehensive action plan to combat terrorism (Resolution
1373). According to the UN Security Council, also those who
support the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of terrorist
acts are to be brought to justice. This signals a notable
development in the interpretation of international law.

The heinous anthrax attacks in the United States clearly
showed the possible threat emanating from weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of terrorists. To prevent terrorists
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, we must focus on the
disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation instruments. We
must now strengthen these instruments and eliminate existing weak
points. In view of the very real threat, it is to be hoped that
the current standstill in efforts to create effective
international control mechanisms for biological weapons does not
mean their complete failure.

The attacks of September 11 highlighted the importance and
necessity of further deepening and enlarging the EU. With
furthering European integration the EU will contribute stability
and security more and more to the whole continent.

Whereas the EU-reaction to the attacks was swift, the military
decisions in this crisis were taken in the national European
capitals. Nevertheless, the General Affairs Council of the EU
approved a package of foreign policy measures on October 16 to
counter the terrorist threat, the European Council decisions of
September 21 and October 19 on combating terrorism gave strong
impetus to the deepening of the EU, particularly in the so-called
"third pillar", i.e. justice and home affairs, but also
in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
This will not be without an impact on the consultations in the
run-up to the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference. Europeans need
to tap this momentum for the reform process.

Regardless of some criticism, re-nationalisation and enhanced
integration are not alternatives with regard to Europe\'s future.
The question is how to organise better CFSP, make it more
effective, give it teeth and bite and thereby credibility. The
latter requires not least capabilities and a political will,
meaning that member states have to give up some of their
cherished traditions. Like it or not, the EU has a role to play
and to meet expectations, be it from elsewhere in Europe, be it
out of self-esteem. And Europe\'s own global interests demand that
we play a global role.

September 11 allowed all the transatlantic partners –
Europeans, Americans, Canadians – to close ranks. We should
use this to solve or at least ease lingering transatlantic
problems. Some points of friction in relations with the US have
persisted from the time prior to September 11 (foreign sales
corporations - tax), others have eased (payment of UN
contributions), and new ones have been added (tariffs on steel,
etc.). Common to all these points of friction is the fact that
the US, conscious of its undisputed superiority as the only
global power, often seemed to us too little willing to work in a
multilateral framework. When George W. Bush\'s Administration came
into office last year, political pundits registered even greater
unilateralist tendencies. There are issues on which the Americans
seem to confirm this view, for instance the renunciation of the
ABM Treaty or the US stance on the Kyoto Protocol. In Europe, the
US attitude has often been interpreted thus: America will engage
in international agreements only if they concur fully with its
national interests.

In reference to multilateralism, a political and cultural
difference exists between the US and most European states.
Europe, in a realistic assessment of its own power potential, has
been relying primarily on multilateralism as the foreign-policy
tool of choice to promote its interests. In contrast, the US, due
to its military, political and cultural self-confidence, can
practice selective multilateralism, meaning that multilateralism
is only one foreign-policy tool among many. In fighting
international terrorism, the US has recognised that it has
partners and that these partners are useful to it. To that
extent, its approach has become more multilateral. At the same
time, the attacks in New York and Washington were felt to
strengthen the legitimacy of US values and interests and America,
conscious of this legitimacy, will try to enforce its aims on its
own if necessary, if no partners are available.

In this context, a further cultural gap becomes apparent. In
drawing their lessons from history, European states have
committed themselves to European integration. The integration
process implies that European states transfer more and more
sovereign rights to the European level. Many Americans observe
this process in disbelief. Many equate the loss of sovereignty
either with the loss of national identity or the sacrifice of
national interest, of which – given the American
self-definition and founding myth - they would never approve. A
further case in point is American reluctance and even refusal to
submit to global institutions like the International Criminal
Court and nowadays even the United Nations themselves.

On the issue of multilateralism, Canadian mind and thinking is
much closer to European culture than to American.

Europeans and Canadians will continue to see a struggle in US
politics between representatives of a more multilateral approach
and those relying on unilateralism. We have to face up to this
reality. Our aim as European allies can only be to encourage the
US to continue to pursue the course of co-operative engagement
which has become clearer in the current crisis. As the struggle
between multilateralism and unilateralism is not merely one of
ideology and conviction but also of scope for action, the second
consequence for us Europeans is that we as partners remain
relevant for such action, i.e. we must have the diplomatic,
police, intelligence and military capabilities to counter the new
dangers to security. The European Security and Defence Policy has
been created for precisely this purpose. And reviews of the
security-policy instruments in each of our countries in the wake
of September 11 must also keep this aim in mind.

At the same time, we must not ignore the fact that conflicts
cannot be resolved solely by military means. The Balkans and
Afghanistan are good examples of how important subsequent
reconstruction is, for instance. These civil support measures are
ultimately also of significance for security-policy, as they give
the societies concerned a future beyond the war. The Europeans
and Canada are doing much more in this field than the US.

The debate about unilateralism and multilateralism must not
obscure the fact that, contrary to the prophecies of doom, the
Atlantic has not grown wider in recent years. Quite the opposite:
the differences noted just now are signs of steadily increasing
closeness. Not least the increasing economic links between the
two sides of the Atlantic demonstrate this. Numerous global
corporations today are at heart Euro-Atlantic companies.
DaimlerChrysler is just one example – think of Bertelsmann\'s
investment in Random House, creating a truly transatlantic media
house, or of Deutsche Bank\'s purchase of Bankers\' Trust.

More than 600 German companies do business in Canada, 200
Canadian enterprises dwell the German market. Europe continues to
be Canada\'s second largest trading partner. Germany is one of the
most important foreign direct investors in Canada, on the other
side Canada is the second most important foreign investor in the
new Bundesländer. Most investments come from Bombardier, just to
name one example.

Over 60% of foreign investment in the United States comes from
the EU, and about 45% of America\'s foreign investment goes to the
EU. According to the US Chamber of Commerce in Germany, the
United States has invested more in Germany than in any other
country around the world. Other example: In the past eight years
US companies have invested ten times more in the Netherlands than
in China.

Europe and North America are the world\'s closest-linked
economic areas, with daily turnover between the two continents
far in excess of a billion Euro. Yet, as we are all aware,
transatlantic relations demand constant effort on the part of all
involved. Here, too, we must not concentrate exclusively on
foreign and security policy, and certainly not that of the old
school. There are challenges facing us in the civil and economic
fields too. We must identify new approaches – whether to
dispute settlement on economic questions or to cartel law
procedures aimed at increased harmonisation – in order to
ease tensions in the economic sphere. I have already mentioned
another subject: the extension of the transatlantic dialogue
beyond subjects reflecting the old East-West mentality.

Only together can Europe and North America protect and defend
our shared convictions – freedom, democracy, human rights
and the rule of law – world-wide. These are ultimately the
values which form the foundation for peace and stability
throughout the world. If, however, Europe, Canada and the United
States pull in different directions, the problems I have outlined
will persist. As long as Europe and North America are prepared to
consider the transatlantic community as a fair partnership, not
just between themselves but also in relation to other cultures
and religions, many states and peoples far beyond the
Euro-Atlantic community will support us. A close transatlantic
partnership will therefore continue to be one of the major
prerequisites for global stability and security as well as peace
and freedom in Europe.

Thank you for your attention.